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BASTARDS-LIMITATIONS-

UNIFORM PARENTAGE

ACT HELD

To BE

APPLICABLE TO ACTION COMMENCED AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE ACT,

TO ESTABLISH

THE LEGAL PATERNITY OF A CHILD BORN

PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT.

Appellant, as guardian ad litem for W.M.V., a minor, brought
this action under the guidelines of the Uniform Parentage Act'
(U.P.A.) to establish the legal paternity of W.M.V. and to obtain a
court order requiring appellee to contribute to the support of
W.M.V. 2 W.M.V. was born out of wedlock on April 7, 1971 and
no man had formerly acknowledged paternity of W.M.V. 3 At the
time of W.M.V's birth, the applicable statute required a paternity
suit to be brought within two years of birth. 4 The appellee argued
that this prior statutory law, repealed concurrently with the
adoption of the U.P.A., was applicable. 5 Appellee moved for and
was granted a dismissal of the action based on the running of the
statute. 6 The North Dakota Supreme Court, reversing the District
Court, held that the U.P.A. is retrospective in operation and the
proper law to be applied in this case. 7 Therefore, this action was not
i. N.D. CENT. CoDEch. 14-17 (Supp. 1976).
2 In the Interest of\V.M.V'.. 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1978). "An action to determine the
CxisteC ofthe Iather and child relationship with respect to a child vho has no presumred father
unde r section 14-17-04 may be brought bv the child. the roother or personal representative of the
child .....
N .D. CET' r. CooF . 14--17-05(3) (1976).
3. 268 N.\V.2dat 782.
4. N.D. CENT. CODEch. 32-36 (1960)/repealed by 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 130-28.
5. 268 N.W.2d at 782. W.M.V. was born in 1971 and the U.P.A. was not adopted until 1975.
This action \s\i. cOmtmettnced in 1977. The appellee argued that the la\\ in effect at the rime of
W.M.V.'s birth, N.D. CENT. CODE, ch. 32-36 (1960), should be applied to this action and therfore,
tie tClion should be barred bv the statute of limitations. [d. Se N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-36-09
(1960)(repealed 1975). "Tite of'bringing action to enforce the obligation of the father of a child born
out ofwedhwck shall he stiject to the forloming lirsitations:
2. Shall not be blrouglt after the lapse of iore than two ycars front the birth of the
child, unless panr itsI has been judicially established, or has been acknow\ ledged by
lt tlher its writting.
Id.
fi. 268 N.AV2d at 782.
7. /d. at 786.
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barred by the running of the statute of limitations. 8 In the Interest of
W.M. V., 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1978).
Under the common law, the illegitimate child was a legal
nonentity. 9 There was no legal relationship between the illegitimate
child and his parents; they owed him no duty of support1 ° nor
could he inherit from either parent. I' He was considered a ward of
the parish. 1 2 A bastard was made legitimate only by a special Act of
Parliament. 13 The first changes in the status of the illegitimate
child, statutes requiring parents to support their illegitimate
children, were more in deference to the economy of the parish
rather than the welfare of the children.14 Initially, the father's only
obligation for support of his illegitimate children was moral.
Gradually, most jurisdictions imposed a statutory duty upon the
father to provide financial support to his children.' 5
Until the adoption of the U.P.A., North Dakota appeared to
have been fairly consistent in its treatment of illegitimate children
in regards to the establishment of paternity and subsequent orders
for support.' 6 The support action was maintainable by the mother
and authorities charged with the support of the child. ' 7 Initially, the
action had to be brought within one year of the birth of the child
but the statute of limitations was later lengthened to two years from
the birth of the child. 18 Since 1968, a series of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution made these and similar statutes subject to Constitutional doubt. 19 The U.P.A. was an attempt to comply with the Constitutional mandate of equal legal treatment of
legitimate and illegitimate children. 20 The substantive portions of
8. Id. at 787.
LAWS OF ENGILAND 459 (1897).
9. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON ITHE
10. 1 S. SCHATKIN. DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.08 at 1-26, 1-27 (4th rev. ed. 1977).

1I. H. CLARK, LAWOF DOMIESTIC RELATIONS § 5.3 (1968).
12. S. SCHATKIN, supra note 10.
13. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9 at 454.55.
14. S. SCHATKIN, supra note I at § 1.09 at 1-30.
15. See H. CLARK, supra note 11.
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-36 (1965)(repealed 1975); N.D. CODE §§ 10500a1-1050037
(Supp. 1926): N.D. REV. CODE §§ 9647-9644 (1905)(repealed 1913): N.D. CODE § 7839-56 (1899):
DAKOTA TERRITORY CODE ch. 27 (1880).
1 7. Id.
i8. N.D. CODE § 10500a31 (Supp. 1926).
19. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968): levv.v. Iouisiana,
391 U.S. 68(1968).
In Levy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Louisiana's wrongful death statute, which did not
allow illegitimate children to recover for the wrongful death of their mother. was inviolation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and therefore was
unconstitutional. 391 U.S. at 71. 72.
A similar result wsas reached in Glona wshen a statute prohibited a mother from recovering for the

wrongful death of her illegitimate children. 391 U.S. at 75.
20. Uniform Parentage Act (U.L.A.). Commissioner's Prefatorv Note.
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the act define the parent and child relationship and to whom the
rights inherent therein pertain. 21 The remainder of the act is
concerned with the sine qua non of equal legal rights, that is, the
identification of the person against whom these rights can be
asserted. 22 In addition, the drafters hoped to fill an additional social
23
need by improving the states' systems of support enforcement.
North Dakota was not the first state to be faced with the
question of retroactive operation of paternity statutes. The position
reached in the instant case is supported by three cases decided in
Mississippi. 24 In 1962, Mississippi adopted a paternity act 25 which
provided that paternity might be determined upon petition of the
mother, the child, or any public authority chargeable by law with
the support of the child. 26 Under the Mississippi Act, the mother's
action against the putative father was still retricted to the period
within one year of the date of birth of the child, unless the
defendant was absent from the state or had acknowledged paternity
21. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-17-01 (Supp. 1976) states that "'parent and child relationship'
means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to
which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations. It includes the mother and
the child relationship." Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE §14-17-02 (Supp. 1976) states that "[t]he parent and child relationship
extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of'the marital status of the parents." id.
22. Uniform Parentage Act (U.L.A.), supra note 20.
North Dakota has substantially adopted the U.P.A. as originally drafted. 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws
Ch. 130-28. It has deleted the section dealing with artificial insemination and all references to the
issuance of new birth certificates in relation to an action under the act. In addition, North Dakota
provides for a jury trial. Id.
Additional states that enacted the U.P.A.; California, Hawaii, Montana, Washington and
Wyoming. Uniform Parentage Act (U.L.A.), supra note 20 at 446.
23. Id. at 447. The U.P.A. was adopted in 1973 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws and was approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in
February. 1974. Id.
24. Palmer v. Mangum, 338 So.2d 1002 (Miss. 1976); Sandifer v. Womack. 230 So.2d 212
(Miss. 1970): Dunn v. Grisham, 250 Miss. 74. 157 So.2d 766 (1963).
In Grisham, the plaintiff brought an action for filiation and support ofan illegitimate child under
the 1962 Missisippi Uniform Act on Paternity. In reversing the trial court, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the Paternity Act of 1962 did not violate a constitutional probitition against
enactment ofex post facto laws even though it was retroactive in operation. 157 So.2d. 769.
In Sandifrr, children, acting by next friend, brought the action to establish that defendant was
their father and to require him to provide for their support. In confirming the ruling of the trial
court, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that suit brought by children under the Mississippi
Uniform Act on Paternity was not barred by a statute prohibiting such proceedings from being
instituted by the mother after the child had reached.the age ofone year. 230 So.2d 213.
In -almcr, the action was brought by the minor child, through her mother as next friend, under
the Mississippi Uniform Law on Paternity to establish the support obligation of the putative father.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that a statute requiring the proceeding to be brought within one
year of the birth of the child was inapplicable as it applied to the mother and not the child and the
child was the real party in interest. 338 So.2d 1003.
25. 1962 Miss. Laws ch. 312.
26. MIss. CODE ANN. ch 93-9 (1962).
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in writing. 2 7 The father's liability for past support was limited to a
period of one year next preceeding the commencement of the
action.28
Under Mississippi's old bastardy act, 29 which was
concurrently repealed with the adoption of the Paternity Act of
1962, the child had no cause of action on his own behalf and the
mother's cause of action was limited to one year from the birth of
the child.3 0 Since the children in each Mississippi case were all over
one year old, the Mississippi court was presented with the issue of
whether the new act applied by its own terms to children born out
of wedlock prior to the effective date of the act. 3 I The Mississippi
court determined that the new act did apply to the children born
prior to the effective date of the Act. 32 Similarly, paternity statutes
have been found to be retroactive in operation in Maine, Alabama
33
and Florida.
27. Id. § 93-9-9.
However, proceedings hereunder shall not be instituted by the mother after the child
has reached the age of one year, unless the defendant is absent from the state so that
personal service of process cannot be had upon him, or, unless the defendant has
acknowledged in writing that he is the father of the child.
Id.
28. Id. § 93-9-11. "The father's liabilities for past education and necessary support and
maintenance and other expenses are limited to a period of one (1) year next proceeding the
commencement of the action." Id.
29. MIss. CODE.ANN. §§ 383-398 (1943)(repealed 1962).
30. Id. § 393. Proceedings under this chapter shall not be instituted by the mother after the child
is twelve months old, unless the defendant be absent from the state so that process cannot be served
on him." Id.
31. See supra note 24.
32. 338So.2d 1002:230 So.2d 212:157 So.2d 766.
33. Ward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 529, 170 So.2d 500 (1964), cert. denied, 277 Ala. 703, 170 So.2d
504 (1965): Thut v. Grant, 281 A.2d I (Me. 1971); Wall v. Johnson. 78 So.2d 371 (Fla.
1955).
In Thut, bastardy proceedings were brought by the illegitimate child and mother against the
putative father. On appeal from an interlocutor order, the Supremejudicial Court denied the appeal
and allowed application of the procedural methods afforded by the Uniform Act on Paternity to enforce rights which arose under old law. 281 A.2d at 6.
The Court in Thut also considered the new cause of action given to the illegitimate child under
the new act and held that the obligation of support is a distinct and continuing duty, therefore, no
vested rights are imposed or personal liabilities created which would render the Act constitutionally
infirm by requiring the defendant to provide continuing future support. Id. at 7.
In Ward, the defendant was found to be the father of an illegitimate child and ordered to pay
child support. The defendant appealed on the basis that the new paternity law 'was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. The Court of Appeals of Alabama confirmed the holding of the
district court stating that the new paternity law did not impair the defendant's vested rights *and
therefore did not violate the constitution. 42 Ala. App. at -, 170 So. 2d at 501.
In Wall, a woman whose illegitimate child was born in New York brought suit in Florida under
the 1951 Bastardy Act to compel the putative father to pay support for the child. The child was born
in 1943 and this suit was commenced in 1955. The court held that the 1951 Bastardy Act was retroactive and therefore created a cause of action in her behalf but her cause of action was barred by the
three year statute of limitations. While the court held the 1951 Bastardy Act to be retroactive in
operation, it did not revive causes of action that were barred under old law. 78 So. 2d at 373.
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In determining the U.P.A. to be retroactive in operation, the
North Dakota Supreme Court relied on prior case law14 to rebut the

argument put forth by appellee that to hold the U.P.A. retroactive
in operation would violate North Dakota statutory law which
provides that statutes are not retroactive unless expressly declared
to be so. 3 5 In Ford Motor Co. v. State, 36 the North Dakota court

concluded that the prospective or retrospective operation of a
statute is a question for the legislature .3 Therefore, a legislative
act, or amendment thereto, is presumed prospective unless a
contrary intent is clearly manifested by the legislature, either
38
expressly or impliedly.
The specific language of the U.P.A. which manifests the intent
of retroactive operation is found in the following words: ".

.

. may

not be brought later than three years after the birth of the child, or
later than three years afterJuly 1, 1975, whichever is later." 39 The
court in W.M. V. found that the words "or later than three years
after July 1, 1975, whichever is later," would not have been
included unless the legislature had intended the statute to be
retroactive in operation. 4° For only when a child had been born
prior to July 1, 1975, could three years after July 1, 1975, be later
:34. Monson v. Nelson, 145 N. W. 2d 892 (N. D. 1966): Gimble v. Montana-Dakota Utilities,
77 N. D. 581, 44 N. W. 2d 198 (N. D. 1950): In re Berg's Estate, 72 N. D. 52, 4 N. W. 2d 575 (N.
D. 1942).
In Monson, the court rejected the argument that silence constituted an express declaration that
provisions of an amendment to the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Act should operate retrospectively
and therefore apply to an accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. 145
N. W. 2d 892.
In Ghblc, the court looked to the language and the history of the use of the language by the
legislature to conclude that an anendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act, which allowed a
workman to bring an action in his own right. w'as prospective in operation and would therefore not
apply to the plaintiff who had received compensation prior to the amendment's affective date. 77 N.
D. 581.44 N. W. 2d 198.
The plaintiff, in In re Berg's Estate. was born prior to the enactment of a statute declaring all
children to be the legitimate children of their natural parents. The action was brought to establish
paternity for inheritance purposes. The court, holding that the plaintiff's action was barred, looked
to the ltur corners of the statute to determine that it wais prospective in operation. 72 N.D. 52. 4
N.W. 2d 575.
35. N. D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (1975). "No part ofthis code is retroactive unless it is expressly
declared to be so." Id.
36.59 N. D. 792, 231 N. W. 883 (1930).
37. Ford Motor Co. v. State. 59 N. D. 792 802.231 N. W. 883. 887 (1930).
38. Noson v. Nelson, 145 N. W. 2d at 897.
39. N.D. CENxr. COm- § 14-17-06 (Supp. 1976). Thc statute in full state as follows:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship as to a child
vho has no presumed father under section 14-17-04 may not be brought later than
three years after the birth of the child, or later than three years after July 1. 1975.
whichever is later. Howsver, an action brought by or on behalfofa child whose paternitv has not been determined is not barred until three \.ears after the child reaches the
age of majority. Sections 14-17-05 and 14-17-06 do not extend the time within which a
right of inheritance or a right toi a succession mas be asserted beyond tile time
providcd by lass relating to distributio i and closing of decedent's estates i to thce
determination of heirship or otherswise.
40. 268 N. XV. 21 at 784.
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than three
otherwise,
derogation
court held

years after the birth of the child. 4 1 Had the court ruled
it would have given the above words no effect in
of the North Dakota Centruy Code. 42 Therefore, the
that the U.P.A. must be construed as being retroactive

in operation.

43

The North Dakota court's finding that the U.P.A. is to be
applied retroactively appears to conflict with the ruling in C.L. W.
VM.J. 4 4 In C.L. W., an illegitimate child brought an action against
the estate of her alleged father to determine that she was entitled to
inherit even though the statute of limitations had run for an action
to determine paternity. 44 In dicta, the court said that the law to be
applied to an action to establish paternity is the law in effect at the
46
time of the child's birth.
The court's conclusion in C.L. W. was supported by State v.
Underseher.47 In Unterseher, the action was commenced prior to the
adoption of the U.P.A. but the trial was held after the effective date
of the U.P.A. 48 The court held that the rules of evidence contained
in the U.P.A. 4 9 would apply to the action but the substantive law
would not. 50 However, Unterseher did not deal with the situation
where the action was commenced after the effective date of the
51
U.P.A.
In W.M. V., the court ruled that except in matters of evidence,
the U.P.A. cannot be applied retroactively to actions commenced
prior to its effective date. 52 Therefore, consistent with C.L. W., the
correct rule is that the law in effect at the time of the child's birth is
applicable to paternity actions unless the legislature had clearly
41. Id.
42. N. D. CENT. CODE 5 1-02-38 (1975). "In enactinga statute, it is presumed that... jTjhe entire statute is intended to be effective.'" Id.
43. 268 N. W. 2d at 785.
44. 254 N. W. 2d 446 (N. D. 1977).
45. C.L.W. v. M.J.. 254N. W. 2d446(N.D. 1977).
46. Id. at 449.
47. 255 N. W. 2d 882 (N. D. 1977). The child was born and the action to establish paternity was
commenced prior to the adoption ofthe U. P. A. Id.
48. State v. Unteseher. 255 N. W. 2d 882 (N. D. 1977).
49. N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-11 (Supp. 1976). The U. P. A. allows evidence of sexual intercourse, expert testimony of the probability of the alleged father's paternity based on the length of
pregnancy, blood tests, medical and anthropological evidence to be admitted if relevant to the issue
ofpaternity of the child. Id.
The court stated that it was a long standing rule that when a statute changing a rule of evidence
goes into effect, all cases tried thereafter must be governed thereby, unless there is a limitation in the
statute. 255 N. ' . 2d at 888.
50. Id. at 891. Since the action was commenced prior to the adoption of the U. P. A.. the substantive law contained therein could not be applied retroactively without express declaration of the
legislature. Id.
51. 255 N. W. 2d 882.
52. 268 N. W. 2d at 785.
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manifested a contrary intent. 53

Implicit in the decision of W.M. V. and supported by dicta, is
the creation of a new cause of action on behalf of an illegitimate
child. 54 Prior to the enactment of the U.P.A., North Dakota
statutes denied a cause of action to the child unless the mother was
deceased or disabled. 5 5 The W.M. V. decision has granted an action
56
on behalf of the child without regard to the position of the mother.
In addition, the statute of limitations does not run on a child's
cause of action to establish paternity until three years after the child
reaches the age of majority.

57

The appellant in W.M. V. raised several constitutional issues,
and although they were not used as a basis for the court's decision,
the court appeared to imply a ratification of those arguments."
Appellant pointed out that the state has recognized that the parentchild relationship extends to all children and parents regardless of
the marital status of the parents. 59 In addition, it is the duty of the
60
father, mother or child of a poor person to support that person.
Therefore, to deny illegitimate children a cause of action to
determine this relationship and the corresponding duty of support,
while granting it to other children who are similarly situated but
fortunate enough to have been born in wedlock or otherwise
legitimated, would be a denial of equal protection of the laws under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 6 1 A
similar Texas statute, although not the direct issue of the action,
which caused this same dissimilarity of treatment between children
born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock or otherwise
53. Id.
54. Id. at 786. fhe court stated that the legislature created a new remedy for the child as
distinguished from the mother. Id.
55. N. D. CENT. CODE 5 32-36-08 (1960) (repealed 1975).
56. See supra note 54.
57. N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-06 (Supp. 1976). "However, an action brought by or on behalf of
a child whose paternity has not been determined is not barred until three years after the child reaches
the age of majority. . .. " Id.
58. 268 N. W. 2d at 787. The court noted that its holding was consistent with its result in In re
Estate of Jensen, 162 N. W. 2d 861 (N.D. 1968), in which it held illegitimacy to be a suspect
classification for purpose of due process-equal protection. Id.
59. Brief for Appellant at 6. In the interest of
..M.V.. 268 N.W. 2d 78 (1978). \A. M. V.
based this contention on a statute providing that "the parent and child relationship extends equally
to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." N. D. CENT..
CODE 5 14-17-02 (Supp. 1976).
60. Id. 5 14-09-10(1971).
It is the duty of the father, the mother and the children of any poor person who is
unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of the
ability of such father, mother or children. Such liability may be enforced by any person furnishing necessaries to such poor person. The promise of an adult son or
daughter to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.
Id.
61. See Gomezv. Perez. 409 U. S. 535 (1973).
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legitimated was held unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court on the grounds that it denied equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
62
Constitution.
In addition, appellant argued that to hold the U.P.A.
prospective in operation only, would be a denial of the due
process. 6 3 This contention was based on the North Dakota case of
Kottsick v. Carlson64 in which the court recognized the relationship of
parent and child as consisting of "a bundle of essential rights
necessary for the preservation of society. "65 The Kottsick court went
on to say that depriving one of his parental rights without just cause
would raise serious constitutional doubts under the Due Process
66
Clause.
Moreover, contrary to the United States Supreme Court,6 7 the
North Dakota Supreme Court appears to have determined that
classifications and differential treatment based solely upon
illegitimacy are inherently suspect and in violation of the fourteenth
amendment ot the United States Constitution and section 20 of the
62. 409 U. S. 535 (1973). The mother of an illegitimate child sought support from the defendant
on behalf of the child. The trial judge found the defendant to be the biological father of the child and
the child in need of maintenance and support from the father. However, under Texas law, because
the child was illegitimate, the father was under no legal obligation to support the child. Had the child
been legitimate, the defendant would have had a legal obligation to provide needed support. The action was based on the common law within the state of Texas and the statute inferred to was not a
focal point of the action. However, because the statute was a codification of the common law, it was
held to be unconstitutional. Id.
The Supreme Court stated the following:
A state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them
substantial benefits awarded children generally. We therefore hold that once a state
posits a judicially enforceable right in behalf of children to needed support from their
natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married his mother.
For a state to do so is "illogical and unjust." (cites omitted) We recognize the lurking
problems with respect to proof of paternity. Those problems are not be to lightly
brushed aside, but neither can they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works
to shield otherwise invidious discrimination.
Id. at 538.
63. 268 N. W. 2d at 783.
64. 241 N. W. 2d 842 (N. D. 1976). Divorced wife and her new husband instituted proceedings
to adopt, without the consent of the former husband, minor children of the wife and former husband.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the divorced father was entitled to a hearing on the
question ofhis fitness and related questions applicable to all parents. Id.
65. Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N. W. 2d 842, 853 (N. D. 1976).
66. Id.
67. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972). Peter andJoan Stanley were not married but lived
together for 18 years during which time they had three illegitimate children. When Joan Stanley
died the children were declared wards ofthe state and placed with court appointed guardians. Plaintiffappealed arguing that since the state must demonstrate in a hearing that married fathers and unwed mothers are unfit before denying them of their children, failure of Illinois to establish his parental fitness denied him equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court reversed, using procedural
due process and traditional equal protection analysis. Id. at 657-58.
Procedural due process involves a balancing of the individual's interest against the state's interest in maintaining the challenged activity. Id. at 651.
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a statutory classification is valid if it is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957).
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North Dakota Constitution. 6 However, because the court was able
to reach its decision without direct consideration of the
constitutional issues, 6 9 it appears doubtful that such consideration
will be fourthcoming in regard to paternity.
By enacting the U.P.A., the North Dakota Legislature
recognized the expanded rights of the illegitimate child which had
been established by the United States Supreme Court. In decisions
since the enactment of the U.P.A., the North Dakota Supreme
Court further defined these rights within the State of North
Dakota. Through W.M. V., the North Dakota Supreme Court has
affirmed the intention of the legislature by interpreting the U.P.A.
to be retrospective in operation and has given substance to the
rights of the illegitimate child by recognizing the U.P.A. 's creation
of an independent cause of action on behalf of the child. While
problems of proof remain and probabilities of proof decrease with
the passage of time, W.M. V. recognizes that such problems do not
outweigh the interest of the child in having paternity established.
PATRICK KRUEGER

68. In re Estate ofJensen. 162 N. W. 2d 861 (N. D. 1968). Plaintiffs appealed from a ruling that
found that only legitimate children of decedent's mother could inherit from the decedent. The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed stating, "the question is whether the classification is reasonable and
necessary to effect the purpose of the law...." Id. at 877. The North Dakota court was not hesitant
to hold § 56-01-05 of the North Dakota Century Code unconstitutional as an invidious
discrimination against illegitimate children in violation of section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 878.
The North Dakota court, in Olson v. Maxwell. 259 N. W. 2d 621 (N. D. 1977), elaborated on
its use of suspect classifications when it said that classifications based on sex, race, illegitimacy and
immutable characteristics are 'inherently suspect" and require strict judicial scrutiny. In addition,
a showing of a compelling state interest, which justifies the discriminatory treatment, must be made.
Id. at 627.
Although the court in iaxicll was not considering illegitimacy, its general statement regarding
suspect classifications in relation to section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution together with its
statement in Jensen leads to the conclusion that the North Dakota Supreme Court has classified
illegitimacy as a suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis.
69. 268 N. N\. 2d at 787.

